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The impact of uncertainty on Disaster Risk Reduction decision-making has become a
pressing issue for debate over recent years. How do key officials interpret and accom-
modate uncertainty in science advice, forecasts and warnings into their decision making?
Volcanic eruptions present a particularly uncertain hazard environment, and to accom-
modate this scientists utilize probabilistic techniques to inform decision-making. How-
ever, the interpretation of probabilities is influenced by their framing. We investigate how
verbal or numerical probabilities affect decisions to evacuate a hypothetical town, and
reasons given for that decision, based upon a volcanic eruption forecast. We find fewer
evacuations for verbal terms than for equivalent numerical terms, and that the former is
viewed as more ambiguous. This difference is greater for scientists, which we suggest is
due to their greater familiarity with numerical probabilities and a belief that they are
more certain. We also find that many participants have a poor understanding of the
relationship between probability and time window stated, resulting in an incorrect
assessment of overall likelihood and more evacuations for the lower likelihood version
of two scenarios. Further, we find that career sector (scientist or non-scientist) influences
evacuation decisions, with scientists tending to reduce the uncertainty by focusing on the
quality and volume of information provided, while non-scientists tended to either
acknowledge or suppress the uncertainty, focusing on actions to take. These findings
demonstrate the importance of identifying communication strategies that mitigate
different perceptions of forecasts, to both enhance end-user decision making and to
prevent premature, delayed, or unnecessary actions.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-SA license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).1. Introduction
Volcanic crises can create conditions of extreme uncer-
tainty for scientists and key officials managing the crisis.
A volcano showing signs of unrest may exhibit changes iner Ltd. This is an open acces
.
458;
z (E.E.H. Doyle),geophysical signals (such as seismic and geodetic changes),
geochemical signals, cause felt earthquakes and result in
visual signs of impending activity (such as increased degassing
or bulging flanks). While indicative of changes occurring in
the volcanic edifice, they do not always lead to eruptions and
may be unreliable as indicators of when an eruption may
occur [62,66,72]. They thus present a challenging environment
for effective response, emergency management planning, and
decision management.
Once an eruptive phase has occurred, volcanoes can also
go through cycles of quiescence, followed by periods of
unrest, periods of activity and then periods of quiescences article under the CC BY-NC-SA license
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gone through at least 3 distinct eruptive periods [23].
Eighteen years after it re-awoke, Soufrière Hills continues
to display unrest and activity, presenting challenges for long
term management and communication as communities
learn to live with the volcano [35,36,67]. The epistemic
uncertainty (the unknowns) and the aleatoric uncertainty
(the stochastic variability) of the volcanic physical process
thus contributes to considerable uncertainty in the crisis
management process itself. In addition, an event such as
this requires inter-disciplinary interaction, and if relation-
ships and procedures are not well established and practiced
before, considerable uncertainty can arise in its manage-
ment due to problems with inter-agency communications,
collaborations, and the understanding of each others' roles,
responsibilities, and inter-dependencies [76,77,19], particu-
larly when under high pressure, short time situations
characterized by high ensuing risk and stress.
This variation in unrest periods, and the potential
for eruption, non-eruption, or continued eruptive cycles,
creates extreme challenges for those involved in the
response as decision makers balance the issue of life safety
and community continuity through the crisis [78,76].
Issues have arisen due to conflicting scientific advice either
from internal and external agencies, or due to the pre-
sence of a wide range of scientific advisory bodies and
individuals (e.g., [51,102,28,12,84,72,101,67]). Based upon
experiences from Guadeloupe in 1976 and St. Vincent in
1979, Fiske [28] highlighted that successful volcanic crisis
management is not just dependent on improved monitor-
ing techniques but upon the communication between
scientists, journalists and the public, and in particular,
the need for experienced chief scientists, who “while not
suppressing scientific disagreements, would attempt to
coordinate the activities of the scientists involved into a
single group effort, to increase communication between
the scientists, and to help ensure that a single and
complete stream of information is made available to civil
authorities and journalists” (ibid, p. 176). Over 20 years
later, during New Zealand's (NZ) Civil Defence exercise
Ruaumoko, which practiced the nationwide response to an
eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field, one of the high-
lighted recommendations was again the demonstrated
importance of having official scientific advice provided
by “one trusted source” [65]. This was in the form of the
Auckland Volcanic Science Advisory Group, which gath-
ered together the social, geological, economic, geophysical
and monitoring groups and communicated this pooled
expertise to the decision makers while also responding to
direct requests for information from the emergency man-
agers. This process was identified as being of a consider-
able benefit to the response process as it helped to prevent
conflicting or confusing messages [65]. Numerous other
volcanic and geophysical events have identified the need
for official scientific advice to be the trusted source of
advice, that delivers appropriate, accurate advice that
meeds the needs of (diverse) decision makers, emergency
managers, and the public. This makes it impossible to
consider a one-size fits all approach, and makes it impor-
tant that recipent organizations not only establish a single
source of advice, but build strong relationships and trustacross agencies via exercises, workshops and meetings
prior to an event, to help build individual and team mental
models of each other's roles, responsibilities, and their
information needs as well as to develop an understanding
of other political and legal issues that may play a role in
the implementation of advice (see [77,19]). As discussed
by Jordan [45, p. 6], in light of the L’Aquila earthquake and
trial, it is vital that the different roles of the science
advisors and the civil decision makers are understood
and kept distinct, as “confusing these roles can lead to
trouble”. In addition, as stated by McGuire et al. [67, p. 75],
it is vital that the “mechanisms that underpin effective
communication during a volcanic crisis are in place long
before a volcano shows signs of unrest” so that seamless
communication between main stakeholder groups can
occur in-event. Thus all efforts need to focus on the
“building of trust between stakeholders, the maintenance
of good working relationships, and the safeguarding of an
open and continuous information flow between all key
players” (p. 75).
Currently in NZ, advice is communicated by a number
of Scientific Advisory Groups across the volcanic regions,
established to bring expertise from various scientific
agencies together [65,98,19], and who often sit within
wider volcanic advisory groups established by the regional
authorities. For example, the Central Plateau Volcanic
Advisory Group was established by the Horizons Regional
Council to ensure that all responding organizations
are “working together to increase community resilience
to volcanic hazards within the Central Plateau” [14].
This group encompasses a Science Focus Group, a Planning
Focus Group, and a Communications Focus Group, all
guided by a framework strategy and Contingency Plan,
and who meet every six months to report on work
programmes, outcomes and future plans, and to help build
relationships and inter-agency coordination.
However, while the goal is to have the experts within a
SAG familiar with each other and other responding agen-
cies via exercises, training, workshops, planning, and other
relationship building activities, the need to call on other
experts (e.g., the Ministry of Health for ash fall advice or
psychosocial issues), changes of personnel within an
agency over time, and changes in agency structure can
create a situation where in fact these groups may be
relatively unfamiliar with each other and their respective
roles and expertise; particularly as the size of an event
grows and extends beyond the regional to the national or
international level, with the impact and management
consequences of these differences being magnified by
the high risk, high stress environment in which they
would have to interact. Developing more comprehensive
inter-agency training and embedding inter-agency opera-
tions into the organizational culture is a crucial first step to
creating the kind of organizational learning required for
“superordinate” organizational response to rapidly escalat-
ing, complex volcanic crises [29]. In the absence of such
capabilities, the Scientific Advisory Group (SAG), which
may thus include individuals familiar or unfamiliar with
each other, thus has an important role in soliciting,
collecting and pooling together a wide range of expertise
into a single source of advice. However, little research has
E.E.H. Doyle et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 10 (2014) 75–101 77been conducted to guide them in how best to commu-
nicate any non-consensus advice and how to communicate
the uncertainty related to this non-consensus to officials
and the public. In addition, the implementation of this
advice is affected by the variability in the legal framework
across countries [31]. To date, many volcanologists have
thus been cautious to communicate uncertainty or dis-
agreement to public officials, for fear of a loss of credibility
or competence [86]. This is not just limited to volcanology.
For example, in the field of meteorology, similar concerns
have been raised regarding the explicit communication of
uncertainty for weather forecasts ([73], as cited in [70]).
Added to the uncertainty implicit in managing the
volcanic event itself, uncertainty thus emerges in relation
to activities such as deciding on and advising of the need
for evacuation in the context of concerns about making an
“economically disastrous, unnecessary evacuation” (Tazieff
1983, as cited in [111, p. 88]; see also [28]). As discussed by
Kilburn [51] the trust between scientists and the public
can be damaged by “accusations of ‘crying wolf’”. Historic
cases identified by Tazieff [102] as “erroneous volcanolo-
gical diagnoses” due to wrong interpretations of actual
facts, or use of deliberately false data, have led to sig-
nificant socio-economic consequences for the affected
communities, as well as damaging trust and relationships.
To this end, in the 70s, both Tazieff [102] and Kilburn [51]
identified the need for practising volcanologists to abide
by a “deontological code” or a “Hippocratic-type” code of
practice to fulfil moral obligations to society. Since then,
the International Association for Volcanology and the
Earth's Interior (IAVCEI) Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols
(1999) have established a set of best practice guidelines for
conduct of scientists during volcanic crises, that incorpo-
rates a guiding principle, and outlines areas that can cause
problems. They highlight that uncertainty should be
acknowledged in communications between scientists and
public officials, and remind scientists that “non-scientists
can deal much better with worrisome information and
uncertainty than many scientists believe” (p. 331). These
issues do not just apply to volcanic eruptions, but also to
tsunami warnings, earthquakes and associated aftershock
sequences, weather warnings, and wildfires. As stated by
Jordan et al. [44], the next vital step in operational
forecasting is to apply the principles of effective public
communication already established by social science
research to the communication of hazard information.
In this manuscript, we next review some of the psy-
chology literatures regarding decision making and uncer-
tainty and its implication for volcanology. We then present
a study investigating the effect of using either numerical or
verbal probabilistic forecasts on decisions to evacuate for a
hypothetical crisis scenario, and explore via a thematic
analysis the reasons provided by non-scientists and scien-
tists for those decisions. The implications of our research
findings for the communication of uncertainty and prob-
abilistic forecasts in volcanology are then discussed.
1.1. Managing uncertainty and decision making
The communication of advice about complex pro-
cesses whose activity (timing, intensity, duration etc.)is characterized by considerable uncertainty over time
has been highlighted as a global issue in disaster research.
In particular, the Risk Interpretation and Action working
group of the Integrated Research on Disaster Risk
(IRDR) framework has identified the need to understand
“the ways in which people interpret risks and how they
respond based on these interpretations” which are
“shaped by their own experience, personal feelings and
values, cultural beliefs and interpersonal and societal
dynamics”, particularly when making decisions under
uncertainty [22]. Fearnley [112] highlights that there are
many approaches across disciplines for negotiating uncer-
tainty and risk, and managing ‘non-quantitative’ uncer-
tainty (that is the ‘un-measurable uncertainty’),
that would be beneficial to the management of volcanic
hazards, particularly when assigning an alert level. These
include more holistic approaches to the co-production of
knowledge across the different stakeholders involved
(including the public) and that combines uncertainty,
ignorance, ambiguity and risk.
Science advice about natural hazards is often subject to
many levels of uncertainty, due to the natural stochastic
uncertainty (the variability of the system), and the episte-
mic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) [82,1]. In addition,
uncertainty and disagreement between scientists regarding
how diverse interpretive judgments influence their deci-
sions about what advice to communicate can arise due to
(a) incomplete information, (b) inadequate understanding,
and (c) undifferentiated alternatives [59, p. 151]. Uncer-
tainty in the context of action can affect both the scientific
advisors in their decisions regarding communication, as
well as the decisions made by the emergency managers
that depend on that advice. Moss and Schneider [71]
proposed seven recommendations for the IPCC regarding
the handling and communication of uncertainties, which
include “Document key causes of uncertainty” and “deter-
mine the appropriate level of precision of your conclusions
after considering the nature of the uncertainties and the
state of science”. Wiedemann et al. [110] advise that experts
should help lay people make informed judgements by
communicating the full range of uncertainties, and stating
clearly what is known. However, they question whether
advice communicated in this manner actually helps non-
experts reach the right conclusions, given differences in
how information is processed by the respective groups.
These approaches do not account for relative differences in
how scientists and non-scientists or citizens process infor-
mation when confronting, complex, uncertain and threa-
tening events [24,96,11,97]. Nor do they consider how non-
scientist, emergency managers are being influenced by their
awareness of the social, economic and political dimensions
of their decision making (e.g., the implicit need to manage
response decisions with economic or political views that
are imposed upon emergency managers). As stated in the
IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols [40], volcanolo-
gists must “understand that a decision-making official who
is presented with an uncertain scientific forecast, clear
socioeconomic issues, and political pressure might not
always follow scientific advice” (p. 330).
Epstein [24] outlines theory for two parallel processing
systems that drive decision making (see also [96,11,97]).
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erate (and hence makes for longer decision times) compu-
tational cognitive processes, and is a learnt process that
consciously and deliberately applies rules and procedures
to the analysis of data (e.g., formal logic, utility maximiza-
tion that have been developed and applied to the problems
being tackled). The analytic system uses algorithms, nor-
mative rules and logic, and does not operate automatically.
It is also oriented towards delayed action, and decisions
made often require ‘justification via logic and evidence’
[24]. This approach is used predominantly by scientists
and risk management professionals to quantify their
analyses and express the outcomes as probabilities and
develops as a result of extensive training in analysing data
surrounding volcanic processes. In contrast, the affective
approach, which is often termed the experiential system,
involves rapid, unconscious affective processes and is
oriented toward immediate action. It is a holistic approach
where behaviour is “mediated by ‘vibes’ from past experi-
ences” [24], and is an evolutionary adaptation that auto-
matically converts uncertain and adverse aspects of
experience into affective responses (e.g., fear, dread, and
anxiety). It thus results in people interpreting risk as an
affective or emotional state or feeling [60,97]. It is thus
influenced by factors in the decision context that affect
emotions (such as the cost of incorrect decisions such
as ordering evacuation when it is unnecessary, or failing to
do so when it is necessary).
There has been recent debate regarding the dual
processing theories of higher cognition [25,26,50,75,104],
criticizing the evidence available for two systems [49,50],
and proposing whether a unified theoretical approach that
explains both intuitive and deliberative judgments as rule
based is more appropriate [53]. Evans and Stanovich [25]
suggest however an approach where “rapid autonomous
processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses
unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning
processes (Type 2)”, the latter of which heavily loads
working memory and utilizes hypothetical thinking.
Thompson [104] argues that in fact type 2 processes
might also be triggered automatically but that, “unlike
Type 1 processes, their completion requires working
memory resources, and that the outcome of those pro-
cesses is more flexible than that of Type 1 processes”.
To discuss this debate further would be beyond the
scope of this manuscript, thus we refer herein to the
affective (similar to Type 1) and analytical (similar to Type
2) processing systems presented by Epstein [24], and
consider that while both systems influence people's jud-
gements, scientists are likely to develop a more analytical
process, and while non-scientists or emergency managers
may adopt either processes depending on the governing
operating procedures, prior experience, and time pres-
sures, they will generally tend more towards affective
processes. The adoption of the affective and analytical
processing systems is thus not an either-or situation, but
rather a more complex balancing act influenced by the
degree of uncertainty or threat in the decision context, and
the relative experiences of both scientists and emergency
managers. While ordinary citizens use some analytical
processing, they are more likely to base their decisionson the more readily available affective processing. Even if
non-scientists adopt an analytical process for their deci-
sion, if the outputs from the two processing systems
disagree, the affective system usually prevails [60]. Analy-
tic processing of scientific information may lead people to
recognize hazards as a significant threat, but their affective
processing of the output often reduces the likelihood of
their acting on this knowledge [108].
Considering decision making under uncertainty for the
analytic system, Lipshitz and Strauss [59, p. 150] state that
uncertainty in the context of action is “a sense of doubt
that blocks or delays action”, and classify it according to
the issue (i.e., what the decision maker is uncertain about)
and the source (i.e., what causes this uncertainty). Uncer-
tainty in the context of the issue can relate to the outcome,
the situation itself, and the alternative actions available,
and uncertainty such as this can also arise due to “undif-
ferentiated alternatives”. Many formal and behavioural
decision theories identify the R.Q.P. heuristic for coping
with uncertainty in decision-making (see [59]), which
represents the Reduction of uncertainty by information
searching, the Quantifying of the magnitude of uncertainty
that cannot be reduced, and the Plugging of the result into
a formal decision-making scheme that incorporates
uncertainty.
From an analysis of written accounts of decisions made
under high levels of uncertainty, Lipshitz and Strauss [59]
found that decision makers reduce, acknowledge or
suppress the uncertainty (see Table 1). From this, they
proposed their RAWFS (Reduce, Assumption-based rea-
soning, Weighing pros and cons, Forestalling, Suppressing)
heuristic, stating that “how decision makers cope, or ought
to cope, with uncertainty is principally determined by the
nature or quality of the uncertainty” [59, p. 160]. This
model assumes however a ‘rational’ or analytical decision
maker, and does not incorporate the uncertainties intro-
duced by individual interpretative processes, biases and
interactions, or the role of more implicit or experiential
modes of thinking [24], except for in the suppressing stage
when behaviours such as “relying on intuition” are con-
sidered (Table 1). Nor does it accommodate the different
interpretive bases of the different stakeholders in the
decision process. The latter becomes important in the
context of one of the key elements of the reduction phase
of their RAWFS heuristic: the soliciting of advice and
opinions of experts; demonstrating how science advice is
not just about providing information for situation assess-
ment, but also about providing advice to help decision
makers understand, acknowledge and reduce the uncer-
tainties in the source and the complex physical systems.
1.2. A survey to investigate uncertainty and probabilities
To address the many risks and uncertainties involved in
volcanic eruptions, due to their complex nature, and to
help facilitate decision making for end users and stake-
holders, it has become increasingly popular for scientists
to use probability statements in their communications
(see full review in Doyle et al. [20]). The IAVCEI Subcomit-
tee for Crisis Protocols [40, p. 330] recommend the use of
“probabilities to calibrate qualitative assessments of risk”.
Table 2
IPCC Qualitative Descriptors used for the Third Assessment Report
Climate Change 2001, as given in Patt and Schrag [83] from Houghton
et al [39, p. 28]. A similar table has been developed based on this by the
WMO [33], but with additional categories directly either side of medium
likelihood.
Probability range Descriptive term
o1% Extremely unlikely
1–10% Very unlikely
10–33% Unlikely
33–66% Medium likelihood
66–90% Likely
90–99% Very likely
499% Virtually certain
Table 1
Methods used to reduce, acknowledge and suppress uncertainty while making a decision, as identified by Lipshitz and Strauss [59, p. 153–154], see also
[58].
Reduce  Collecting additional information,
 deferring decisions until additional information becomes available,
 soliciting advice and following SOPs,
 filling in gaps in factual knowledge through assumption based reasoning.
Acknowledge  Taking the uncertainty into account in the selection of an action by incorporating slack into the decisions/actions,
 improving readiness by generating new alternatives to pre-empt a specific potentially negative outcome,
 weighing up the pros and cons of an approach.
Suppress  Ignoring the uncertainty,
 relying on intuition,
 Rationalizing and removing the doubts that block action.
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prefer to receive a deterministic forecast (eruption
expected within a time window) over a probabilistic
statement (X% probability within a time window), attri-
buting this preference to a “reluctance to take responsi-
bility for interpreting inherently uncertain information
during a crisis” (p. 312). The communication of probabil-
istic statements such as these, whether in numeric or
linguistic format, is complicated by the fact that they can
be misinterpreted due to the framing, directionality and
probabilistic format adopted [9,38,47,48,57,103]. Verbal
phrases are seen as more ‘accessible’ to the public, and
are generally better understood than their numerical
counterparts [107,83,101]. However, such verbal phrases
(e.g., likely, unlikely) are subject to the ‘translation issue’,
whereby people's interpretation of the numerical equiva-
lent of these terms varies widely [103,17,89,57]. This can
result in poor and/or inconsistent decisions based not on
the data itself, but on the misinterpretation of the
probabilistic data.
To address the need to convey quantitative probabilistic
risk assessments, while still conveying information in an
‘accessible’ format that can inform (diverse) decision needs,
reports should adopt a dual approach with sophisticated parts
using a numeric format, and more general parts using verbal
phrases and narratives [82]. 'Translation tables' (Table 2) are
then used to convert from verbal to numerical terms. It is
important to highlight the use of tables such as this, as the
framework may not match people's intuitive use of
the language [82], and they may find it hard to suppress the
meanings they normally associate with these terms [48].
Our previous research has investigated the perception
of numerical and probability forecasts for volcanic erup-
tions with scientific and response agencies who would
usually respond to a natural hazard event (see Section 2),
including1. The use of translation tables in volcanology [21], find-
ing that scientists and non-scientists differ in transla-
tions of verbal likelihood phrases into numerical
equivalents, and that inconsistency with the IPCC
translation scales (e.g., Table 2) supports the develop-
ment of a translation table built from the targetcommunity (non-scientists) for hazard communica-
tions, to match their intuitive use of these terms.2. Whether scientists and key decision makers differ in
their interpretations of event likelihoods within fore-
cast time windows (e.g., “there is a 68–88% chance of an
explosive eruption in the next 10 years”; [21]), finding
that for long time windows (10 years) participants
skew their judgment of an event likelihood towards
the end of the time window, rating the likelihood of an
event occurring ‘this year’ as less than year 10. Using
the term “within” instead of “in” was found to mitigate
some of this skew.3. That this skew in perception also occurs for short-term
time windows (under one week; [20]) that are of most
relevance for emergency warnings, and that the use
of phrasing “within” instead of “in” did not mitigate
this skew for short forecasts. They also found a skew
in perceptions for probability-free statements such as
“threat of an eruption within 2–3 days”.Doyle et al. [20] suggest that these skew in time
perceptions for forecasts reflects participants overlaying
information in the statement with their understanding
of volcanoes, in a manner similar to the base rate effect
[48,17,82,57]. However, both of these studies [21,20],
considered only the participants' perceptions of the like-
lihood of an eruption. Herein, we investigate how these
perceptions influence participants' action choices, and the
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numerical or verbal probability format in a forecast influ-
ences the choice to issue an evacuation, and how those
decisions and reasons vary between scientists and non-
scientists, and between different likelihood scenarios.
2. Method
Following Doyle et al. [21,20], participants were direc-
ted to the online survey described briefly above through
a snowball approach via email contact with individuals in
organizations from the natural hazard, physical and social
science community in New Zealand, and from emergency
management and civil defence authorities. These organi-
zations included GNS Science (Geological and Nuclear
Science), NIWA (National Institute for Water and Atmo-
spheric Research), NZ universities, MCDEM (Ministry of
Civil Defence and Emergency Management), regional and
local CDEM groups, emergency and protective services,
and lifeline companies. In addition, the survey was deliv-
ered internationally to capture global perspectives. Addi-
tional recruitment was conducted though advertisements
in bulletins and on-line notice boards, such as the MCDEM
e-bulletin, the international ‘Volcano Listerv’ (run by
Arizona State University), the bulletin board of the Com-
prehensive Emergency Management Research Network
(CEMR), and in the Oceania newsletter of the International
Association of Emergency Managers. In total, 179 partici-
pants completed the survey; 76 were located in NZ, 36 in
North America, 15 in Europe, 7 in Australia or Oceania/
Pacific, 2 in South America, 2 in Central America, 1 in Asia,
1 in the Caribbean, and 6 undeclared.
The online survey was administered through the Qual-
trics Survey Research Suite software (Qualtrics Labs Inc.,
Version 2.03s©2011) which randomly assigned each parti-
cipant to either a ‘numerical’ or ‘verbal’ experimental
group for the survey. The survey was anonymous, and
participants identified their primary employment sector
from the options listed in Table 3, from which they were
grouped into scientists (n¼92) and non-scientists (n¼85)
with 2 undeclared.
For the two questions discussed herein, participants
were presented a hypothetical volcanic scenario depicting
an unrest episode affecting a town. The scenario provided
limited information about the town, to enhance the
ambiguity of the decision scenario. Participants were then
told that it takes at least 48 h to execute an evacuation of
the “capital city”, and given the volcanologists' forecast of
eruption likelihood within a time window. ParticipantsTable 3
Categories provided for participants to select their primary em
Category
Scientific or technical (agency, university or research institut
Central/national government, civil defence, emergency mana
Local/regional government, civil defence, emergency manage
Public safety, emergency services (police, fire, ambulance, re
Lifelines (infrastructure, water, telecommunications, electrici
Other.were then asked whether they would evacuate the town,
when they would evacuate, and to comment on their
decision. The format of this hypothetical decision-making
scenario was based upon a standard approach used in
psychology to explore the effect of specific wordings,
formats and probabilities on action choices (see e.g.,
[46,47]), and this approach was adopted to facilitate an
investigation of the effect of using either verbal or numer-
ical probabilities on decisions to evacuate.
The probabilistic statement of event likelihood pre-
sented to participants included a time window which for
experiment 1 stated “the volcanologists state that there is a
73–83% probability of an eruption occurring within the next
2 weeks”, and for experiment 2 stated “… there is a 45–55%
probability of an eruption occurring within the next 3 days”,
as depicted in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. For each experi-
ment, one group received the ‘numerical’ probability
statements described (n¼73 for experiment 1, n¼69 for
experiment 2), while the other received the equivalent
‘verbal’ probability statements using the translation out-
lined in the IPCC translation Table [83]; resulting in the
statements “… a likely chance of an eruption occurring
within the next 2 weeks” and “… a medium likelihood chance
of an eruption occurring within the next 3 days” (n¼71 for
both experiments).
Both a within- and between- subject designs [3] were
used to analyse the responses. All participants were pre-
sented with both experiments, and a randomised coin-toss
was used to assign a participant to either the numerical or
the verbal condition for each experiment. Between-subject
analyses were thus conducted between the responses to
either the numerical or verbal version, and between
the scientists' and non-scientists' responses, for each
experiment. Experiment 2 represents a higher likelihood
scenario (45–55%, 3 days) compared to experiment 1
(73–83%, 2 weeks), and thus an additional within-subject
analysis was conducted across the two experiments. For
both experiments, investigations initially focused on a
quantitative analysis of the action choices (evacuation
and timing) made by each group presented with either
the numerical or verbal probability statement, as well as
the differences between the judgments of scientists and
non-scientists within each group. For these comparisons,
we use the χ2 test ([106, p. 44–45]).
We then analysed the comments shared by participants
in response to their decisions using thematic analysis to
identify patterns of meaning [6,91]. This enabled us to
identify key themes in the understanding of the science
in the scenario and evacuation decision considerations. Toployment sector [21,20].
Grouped as
e) Scientists
gement (Ministry, agency etc.). Non-scientists
ment (Council, agency, etc.).
scue, response, etc.).
ty, transportation, gas, etc.).
Fig. 2. Screen shot of experiment 2, showing the probability statement presented to numerical experiment group. As of experiment 1, the verbal group
received the equivalent probability statement using the translation outlined in the IPCC translation table [83], and resulting in the statement “… a medium
likelihood chance of an eruption occurring within the next 3 days”.
Fig. 1. Screen shot of experiment 1, showing the probability statement presented to the numerical experiment group. The verbal group received the
equivalent probability statement using the translation outlined in the IPCC translation table [83], and resulting in the statement “… a likely chance of an
eruption occurring within the next 2 weeks”.
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Braun and Clarke [6] and followed a five step process
involving (a) familiarization with the data (through reading
and re-reading the free text responses), (b) generating
initial codes from interesting features within the data in a
systematic fashion, (c) searching for themes by collating and
clustering these codes into potential themes, (d) reviewing
the themes and developing a thematic map, and (e) defin-
ing and naming the themes. Throughout this process, we
utilized a theoretical thematic analysis approach [6], whereour identification of themes was driven by our research
questions regarding decision making, uncertainty, and
inter-agency communications and evacuation issues. This
is in contrast to an inductive analysis where themes are
identified in a ‘bottom up’ way without being influenced by
theoretical and epistemological commitments. Throughout
this process, the codes were continuously reviewed and
evaluated in a recursive manner to assess whether the
existing codes accommodated the breadth of participants'
responses (as of [52]).
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number of participants who raised a particular comment
or theme. However, to analyse the prevalence of a theme
across experiment groups, we adopt the approach of Dalla
[16] and Kim [52] (as cited in [7]) whereby we report
frequency counts of theme occurrences to indicate the
strength and consistency of a theme between groups,
rather than the number of different speakers who articu-
lated that theme. We thus use only descriptive data
(numbers and percentages) to report the comparative
analysis between themes in each group, to illustrate the
strength and consistency of a theme within each group.
We do not conduct a statistical analysis on the occurrence
of the themes within each group, as we have ‘no way
of interpreting what is not reported in qualitative data’
[7, p. 261]. Thus we consider the meaning, importance,
value and validity of a particular theme is not defined by
whether it is significant or not in statistical analysis of its
frequency [7] and that such a statistical analysis would be
inappropriate and misleading.
3. Experiment 1: verbal and numerical probabilities
We consider first the decision making scenario where
the numerical group read the probability statement “… the
volcanologists state that there is a 73–83% probability of an
eruption occurring within the next 2 weeks...”, whereas the
verbal group read the probability statement “…the volca-
nologists state that there is a likely chance of an eruption
occurring within the next 2 weeks” (see Fig. 1). Fig. 3
illustrates the evacuation decision or not for the scientists
and non-scientists, for both the numerical and verbal
groups.
For the group presented with the numerical statement,
90.4% of participants who answered (n¼73) chose an
evacuation when presented with the numerical statement,
with 83.6% in the first week and 46.6% immediately on
Monday (today). In comparison, 71.8% of the group pre-
sented with the verbal statement (n¼71) chose an eva-
cuation when presented with the verbal statement, with
64.8% evacuating in the first week and 45.1% immediately
on Monday (today). There is a significant relationship
between the format of the probability statement and the
evacuation decision, with participants choosing an evacua-
tion more often when presented with the numerical
statement ‘73–83%’ compared to the verbal statement
‘likely’ (χ2(1, N¼144)¼7.914, p¼0.005, medium effect size
V¼0.234).
Considering the behaviour of participants who identi-
fied as scientists and non-scientists separately, for the
numerical group, 95.1% of scientists (n¼41) and 84.4%
(n¼32) of non-scientists choose an evacuation. However
for the verbal group, only 69.7% of scientists (n¼33) and
73.7% of non-scientists (n¼38) choose an evacuation.
There is a significant relationship between likelihood
format and the decision to evacuate for the scientists, (χ2
(1, N¼74)¼8.699, p¼0.003, moderate effect size V¼
0.343), but not for the non-scientists (χ2(1, N¼70)¼
1.179, p¼0.278). The scientists are more likely to choose
an evacuation for the numerical statement than the verbal,
and are thus effectively more ‘sensitive’ to the differentprobability format than the non-scientists. This may be
due to a preference for, or greater familiarity with, numer-
ical probability statements that makes them appear more
precise or certain to scientists, while their verbal equiva-
lents seems more vague and less likely.
Interestingly, there is no significant relationship
between the numerical and verbal groups and the timing
of the evacuation decision immediately on Monday (today)
for all respondents (χ2(1, N¼131)¼0.204, p¼0.652), for
scientists (χ2(1, N¼69)¼0.305, p¼0.581), or for non-
scientists (χ2(1, N¼61)¼1.346, p¼0.246). This suggests
that, for this scenario, while probability format affects
the evacuation decision, it is not affecting the urgency of
the resultant evacuation. There are however some respon-
dents who do choose to delay their evacuation (see Fig. 3),
and it is important to understand both their perspectives
and those who chose not to evacuate.
3.1. Reasons for evacuation decisions
A thematic content analysis was conducted on the free
text responses provided by participants to experiment 1, to
help us understand the reasons behind their evacuation
decisions and timing, as discussed in our methodology. A
number of key themes were identified (see Table 4),
discussed in turn in the following sections.
3.1.1. Understanding the probability and time forecasts
Considering first the group who read the numerical
version of the probability statement (78–83%, 2 weeks),
four participants stated that the event could occur anytime
from now and that an evacuation should occur as soon as
possible, therefore recognizing the real risk of an event
today. I understand the statement as implying that the eruption
could occur anytime within the next two weeks, therefore
if an evacuation should take place, it should be BEFORE
the actual eruption, not waiting until it is too late.
[scientist, numerical]
In the comment above, the decision of when to evac-
uate may have involved working back from the end of the
time window and incorporating the time required for an
evacuation, and comments by a number of participants
appeared to reflect this approach. Two participants also
noted that the likelihood of an eruption being equal
throughout the week. The probability of an eruption occurring is constant, i.e.,
the likelihood of an eruption occurring on the first Mon-
day is the same as it happening on the last Sunday, so
evacuate the town as soon as possible (assuming the town
is in the path of likely hazards) [scientist, numerical]
This likelihood distribution is reasonable based on the
information provided, particularly when an evacuation
decision needs to be made; however, strictly speaking,
the probability described may represent an increase,
decrease or plateau of activity throughout the time
Fig. 3. The evacuation decision or not, and the time chosen to evacuate, for experiment 1 (Fig. 1) and numerical probability experiment group (73–83%) and
the verbal probability experiment group (likely). Results are shown for participants who identified as scientists (dark grey) and non-scientists (light grey).
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could culminate in a major eruption or dormancy after a
short duration of unrest, after a long lull in unrest, or
continue as consistent ongoing unrest over long periods of
time, or ongoing irregular periods of unrest.
The participants who read the verbal probability state-
ment (likely, 2 weeks) raised more comments about theprobability translations and time forecasts than the numer-
ical group, with 10 occurrences of this theme in the verbal
group responses compared to 6 occurrences in the numer-
ical group (as illustrated in Table 5). As above, participants
noted that the eruption could “happen any time from now
on”, and “anytime within those 2 weeks”, or assumed “the
estimated probability applies equally for the entire two week
Table 4
The key themes and codes identified from the free text responses to experiments 1 and 2.
Key theme Code from text
Evacuation thresholds
Evacuation threshold – probability is high enough for evacuation; evacuation threshold – probability needs to
be higher for evacuation, probability too low
Evacuation technicalities
Complexities of evacuation issues and processes; evacuation process – education awareness of public;
evacuation time scheduling; humanitarian vulnerable pets special needs; lives, safety, order, daylight etc;
mandatory evacuation, or not mandatory; seat of government; self or voluntary evacuation (in evacuation
technicalities); staged evacuation, prioritized evacuation; time restraints, short time
No time to lose
ASAP, why wait, no time to lose, better safe than sorry, before % increases; earlier evacuation better;
evacuation time equals time until probability increases; evacuation can be cancelled; evacuation planning,
prep, marshalling resources; precautionary principle, proactive, prudent, err on side of caution; too late
Let's wait and see
Depends on volcano behaviour; evolving processes n probabilities; monitoring of situation; wait delay;
waiting may increase certainty; no action – indecisive decision makers
Managing uncertainty (MU)
MU - Cost benefit Cost – benefit; risk, risk tolerance, threat
MU - Assumptions made
Future outcome ok; information good, reliable; no prior concern; processes (emergency management and
evacuation); time and forecasts; what information means; impacts; ignored some stats
MU - Incomplete information,
information needed
Volcano and eruption type, hazards, location of town, risk to city, impact, intensity; better information,
general, more information, more evidence, population demographics etc. history so far; general science
dialogue monitoring, data; risk, general risk, loss of life; probability, time forecasts, temporal constraints
MU - Level of certainty or
confidence
Certain, certainty; discussion of confidence; uncertain, uncertainty, no certainty, vague
Time forecasts
Could occur anytime – no definite time, as some point in near future; could occur now, today, within next
48 h, any time from now on – focus is on NOW; decision depends on timescale; difficulty understanding
probability for a particular day; don't believe it is possible to give stats over this short time frame; don't know
when within timescale; equal probability throughout the week; greater probability within 48 h; it may not
erupt at all, if at all etc; likelihood increasing at rapid pace; long time scale means ramping up; not enough %
variability through time; probability increases after 48 h; short window implies accelerating unrest; should
be a shorter time interval; views end of time window as event occurrence; will occur tomorrow
Probability translations Verbal to numerical, numerical to verbal, etc.
Science advice, understanding, role
Eruption intensity, magnitude; information quality; scales; scientists make decision, should not make
decision, science conflict, scientists reluctant to give certain advice; trends, increasing or decreasing
probability; volcano type, different type of hazards
Public action
Empowerment of the public; preparing the public; public evacuation plans; public unlikely to evacuate, won't
evacuate, non-compliance, non-compliance in the future, non-compliance management; self or voluntary
evacuation (in public action)
Public perception Justify; public criticism trust, credibility; public observations of activity and reassurance, behaviour
Future issues – negatives and
positives
False alarm, evacuation fatigue, cry wolf; positive – education, experience, practice; recovery and when to
return
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about the fact that the eruption “may not occur”: Although there is a likely chance of an eruption occurring in
the next 2 weeks, it may not erupt at all. [non-scientist,
verbal] We don't know within that 2 week period when [or if] the
explosion will take place, [no career given, verbal]This possibility of a non-event was rarely discussed for
the numerical statement, which suggests that the verbal
probability statement is more ambiguous than the numer-
ical probability statement. This is in line with the quantita-
tive analysis, where 90.4% of people choose an evacuation
for the numerical statement “73–83%”, compared to 71.8%
for the verbal statement “likely”. High probability of an eruption and people should be
moved to save lives [non-scientist, numerical]Interestingly, for the verbal probability statement sce-
nario, several chose to translate the verbal probability
term into a numerical equivalent, including “I consider“likely” to be around 75% chance”, “Likely sounds like 50/50
chance”, “Likely¼60–80%”, “interpreting likely as a … prob-
ability410–30%”. For the numerical probability statement
scenario (73–83%), a number of participants commented
about this being a “3 in 4 chance”, translating the prob-
ability into a ‘natural frequency format’ which is suggested
by Gigerenzer and Edwards [32] to enhance Bayesian
reasoning. Both these translations demonstrate the wide
range of equivalents to these verbal terms, and the relative
familiarity that some participants may have with prob-
abilities. It also illustrates how participants attempted to
reduce the ambiguity of the verbal probability term by first
converting it into a numerical counterpart prior to making
a decision. This demonstrates the key limitation of verbal
statements: while they are more ‘accessible’ to readers
(Section 1.2), any translation made by participants increases
the cognitive load while also increasing the potential for
translation mistakes, biases, and miscommunications.
3.1.2. Using and understanding the science advice
For both the numerical and verbal groups, several
participants raised comments about the science described
in the statement, with similar issues raised by both groups.
The majority of these highlighted that the evacuation
Table 5
The total number of occurrences (N) of each theme provided in the free text responses for the numerical and verbal condition of each experiment, as well
as the number of those occurrences which came from those who chose to evacuate (Yes) and who chose not to evacuate (No). As described in our
methodology, these numbers do not represent the number of participants that articulated that theme, but the number of times a theme occurred, and for
this table and subsequent tables they are shown to indicate prevalence and strength of a theme.
Themes Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Numerical Verbal Numerical Verbal
N Yes No N Yes No N Yes No N Yes No
Evacuation thresholds 15 13 2 7 3 4 10 3 7 11 4 7
Evacuation technicalities 29 24 5 25 20 5 14 11 3 23 20 3
No time to lose 32 26 6 26 23 3 16 15 1 21 18 3
Let's wait and see 11 9 2 10 5 5 8 5 3 12 10 2
Managing uncertainty (MU) 25 22 3 34 13 21 17 10 7 15 8 7
MU – cost benefit 3 3 0 3 0 3 4 4 0 7 4 3
MU – assumptions Made 4 4 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 0
MU – incomplete information, information needed 14 12 2 19 7 12 10 3 7 6 3 3
MU – level of certainty or confidence 4 3 1 10 4 6 1 1 0 1 0 1
Time forecasts 6 6 0 10 9 1 5 5 0 1 1 0
Probability translations 4 4 0 4 2 2 2 1 1 3 3 0
Science advice, understanding, role 9 9 0 8 4 4 7 3 4 3 2 1
Public action 9 8 1 6 6 0 3 2 1 8 4 4
Public perception 2 1 1 5 2 3 2 0 2 4 2 2
Future issues – negatives, positives 4 3 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 0 2
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volcano type, and the different type of hazards, and that
they made assumptions about these impacts to make their
decision. For example Would depend on the anticipated magnitude or intensity
of the likely eruption. If catastrophic eruption is the
typical activity, start preparing for evacuation immedi-
ately; begin the process of evacuation of non-essential
residents as soon as is practical. If a lower intensity
eruption is more likely, then begin preparation and
logistics for removal and track the intensity of the activity.
If intensity is on an upward trend, then begin evacuation
of non-essential residents as soon as it can be done in a
orderly way. [scientist, numerical]Several participants also considered the potential for the
situation to change during the specified time forecast, refer-
ring to the ‘trend’ of activities, and ‘increasing’ or ‘decreasing’
probabilities. They then chose to either delay their evacuation
based on this evolving situation, or to modify the evacuation
process when more information became available Preparations should be made for evacuation and the
volcano should be closely monitored. If activity increases
then evacuations should be made [scientist, verbal] Evacuation can be ramped down if activity in subsequent
days shows waning unrest, but marshalling plans and
transportation resources need to be staged appropriately
to respond to rapid escalation of unrest. [non-scientist,
verbal]These responses indicate that people are making some
decisions about when action might be required. That is,
they appear to be forming decision thresholds.3.1.3. Evacuation decision thresholds
In the example comments provided above, we can
identify a number of decision ‘thresholds’ where the
evacuation decision depended on the current or evolving
situation. This theme was raised more often in the numer-
ical group than the verbal group, with this theme occur-
ring 15 times in the responses to the numerical statement
and 7 times in response to the verbal statement (Table 5).
This raises the possibility that people can move up and
down a decision process more readily with numerical
information than with verbal information.
For the numerical statement, 13 of the occurrences of
this theme referred to the probability being “high enough
for evacuation”, and also originated from those who chose
to evacuate (see Table 5) A 78% chance of an eruption is too high to not take action.
I would evacuate asap [non-scientist, numerical] If the probability of eruption is that high, then I wouldn't
muck around – dependent on whether it's possible to get a
better reading within a 48 h window. If this is possible
then I'd delay until the probability is higher. [non-
scientist, numerical]However for the verbal probability 5 of the 7 occur-
rences of this theme referred to the probability “needing to
be higher for evacuation”. I think that the probability of an eruption needs to
be higher than ‘likely’ to require evacuation. [scientist,
verbal] I would not recommend evacuation based on the daily
bulletin alone with a statement such as “likely chance”. It
would get my attention to start the planning process only.
[non-scientist, verbal]
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“likely” was chosen from the IPCC tables to be the verbal
equivalent of the “73–83%” probability (likely¼66–90%,
Table 2). However, the evacuation decision, and the com-
ments raised for each statement above, suggests that the
participants do not see the terms “73–83%” and “likely” as
equivalent, with one scientist stating it “sounds like 50/50
chance”. They are assuming that the verbal statement
represents a lower ‘possibility’ scenario than the corre-
sponding numerical statement, preferring to wait for a
higher likelihood in the former case before initiating an
evacuation. Inconsistencies with the IPCC translation table
were also identified by Doyle et al. [21] who found that
‘likely’ is translated to 68714% and “very likely” is
83710%, with wide ranges of 28% and 20% respectively
due to the varying interpretations or the ‘meaning’ of
these words. The judgments found here, with lower
evacuations for the “likely” scenario than its numerical
equivalent (73–83%), suggest that the choice to use either
verbal or numerical terms in a forecast not only affects
translations and likelihood perceptions, but has clear
impacts on evacuation decisions, timing, and reasoning.
3.1.4. Decision urgency: “No time to lose”, “Let's wait and
see”
When commenting on why they chose an evacuation,
a number of participants stated that there was “no time
to lose”, that an evacuation should occur “ASAP”, and that
“it is better to be proactive” or to take a “precautionary”
approach. 73–83% would indicate to me that an eruption is immi-
nent and evacuations should begin immediately and
probably should've started much earlier when the prob-
ability was around 30% [scientist, numerical]
As would be expected based on the findings so far,
there was a greater occurrence of the theme “no time to
lose” in responses to the numerical statement (32 occur-
rences) than in responses to the verbal statement (26
occurrences), reflecting the urgency of the situation.
Within this theme the participants who received the
verbal statement also raised more comments that related
to evacuation planning, preparation and marshalling of
resources, with 14 occurrences of the theme ‘evacuation
technicalities’ overlapping with the ‘no time to lose’ theme
for the verbal group (compared to 7 overlapping occur-
rences for the numerical group).1 The “boiled frog” scenario is referred to often in disaster and
business communities to describe “creeping” disasters and crises, it
describes a frog that when placed in a pot of cold water which is being
gradually heated, will fail to recognize the increasing danger and thus get
boiled alive. However, if this proverbial frog is put directly into hot water,
it will recognize the dangerous situation and jump straight out of the pot.
This metaphor thus describes a number of problems that can arise with
creeping disasters: failing to recognize the accumulation of many small
changes which can amount to a major crisis; normalization bias; and
personnel fatigue and performance issues for long duration events.The process should start immediately so that the planning
and resourcing is done before the eruption starts as it is
going to take 48 h to complete the evacuation. If the pre-
planning is done and those evacuated who wish to move
of their own free will then it makes it easier to evacuate
those who are reluctant to go but will when the eruption
is imminent. [non-scientist, verbal]
Unsurprisingly, the majority of those comments relating
to evacuation technicalities came from participants who
identified themselves as non-scientists, whose responsibility
it would be to conduct these activities during an actualevent (see Table 6). In addition, it is unclear whether these
participants are interpreting these probabilities as an indi-
cation of when to plan, or when an eruption will occur.
Interestingly, some respondents in both the numerical
and the verbal probability group raised comments that
were classified under the theme “let's wait and see”;
with 11 occurrences of this theme in the numerical group's
comments, and 10 occurrences for the verbal group
(Table 5). They preferred to monitor the situation, with
the eventual evacuation decision stated as depending
upon the volcano behaviour, evolving processes and prob-
abilities and that waiting may “increase certainty”. A few more days monitoring data should improve con-
fidence of advice re probability. But can't wait too long.
Review decision when to start process in 2 days time
unless prior increase in parameters/certainty. [non-scien-
tist, numerical]
Preparations should be made for evacuation and the
volcano should be closely monitored. If activity increases
then evacuations should be made. [scientist, verbal]
The decision to either “wait and see”, or act as there is
“no time to lose”, is not just dependent upon the scenario
and forecast format, and participants' decision concerns,
but also their prior perceptions of the potential outcomes
of a period of volcanic unrest and their perceptions of
event likelihood throughout the time window [20]. Thus
many participants may assume the situation must only
escalate (“no time to lose”) and fail to recognize the
multiple potential outcomes [105].
3.1.5. Managing uncertainty
In the comments cited above, several approaches can
be identified where participants reduced the uncertainty
of the scenario to help them decide whether and when to
evacuate. This includes making assumptions about the
situation, the hazards or the advice, and requesting or
waiting for more monitoring data, before making a deci-
sion to evacuate. Those that delayed their decision
(for more information) are still making a decision: the
decision not to act, not to issue an evacuation. However, it
is unclear how this relates to how they manage uncer-
tainty versus being paralyzed by it. It also raises the
interesting question as to how the data they have available
now (probability forecast) may frame their interpretation
of any future data. For example, the “boiled frog” scenario1
could reduce their sensitivity to incremental differences in
“likelihood” over time. Thus once the process commences,
the process itself may be contributing to how people frame
new data.
Table 6
The total number (Nt) of occurrences of all identified themes from the free text responses for each experiment group (e.g., scientists in the numerical
condition) in experiment 1, using the themes as described in Table 4. The number (N), and percentage (%) of occurrences of each particular theme relative
to Nt, is also shown for each experiment group. Note that not all participants indicated whether they were non-scientists or scientists, and so for some
themes there is a difference in the total number for an experimental group, as illustrated in Table 5.
Experiment 1 Numerical Verbal
Nt (number of occurrences of all themes in each experiment group): Science Non-science Science Non-science
93 78 80 91
Number (N) and % of each theme occurrence relative to all theme occurrences
Evacuation thresholds 8 9% 7 9% 4 5% 3 3%
Evacuation technicalities 13 14% 16 21% 7 9% 19 21%
No time to lose 15 16% 17 22% 9 11% 17 19%
Let's wait and see 6 6% 5 6% 5 6% 5 5%
Managing uncertainty (MU) 17 18% 8 10% 19 24% 16 18%
MU – cost benefit 2 2% 1 1% 1 1% 2 2%
MU – assumptions made 4 4% 0 0% 2 3% 0 0%
MU – incomplete information, information needed 9 10% 5 6% 11 14% 9 10%
MU – level of certainty or confidence 2 2% 2 3% 5 6% 5 5%
Time forecasts 4 4% 2 3% 4 5% 3 3%
Probability translations 3 3% 1 1% 4 5% 1 1%
Science advice, understanding, role 5 5% 4 5% 6 8% 2 2%
Public action 4 4% 5 6% 1 1% 5 5%
Public perception 0 0% 2 3% 2 3% 3 3%
Future issues – negatives, positives 1 1% 3 4% 0 0% 1 1%
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information about the town, to enhance the uncertainty
of the scenario. For example, participants were not told
how far away the townwas from the volcano, or what type
of volcano it was. Through this design, we aimed to
identify what they judged to be the main factors affecting
their decisions, and how they managed the uncertainty. As
noted in Section 1, Lipshitz and Strauss [59] showed that
decision makers reduced, acknowledged, or suppressed
the uncertainty in order to make a decision (see Table 1).
In our themes defined above, the theme let's wait and
see and related comments can be considered to fall into
the “reduced” uncertainty category of Lipshitz and Strauss
[59] as individuals defer (or avoid) their decision until
additional information becomes available, or until after
they can reinterpret incremental data. Considering just
those comments that display approaches to managing
uncertainty, the majority refer to having incomplete infor-
mation, and that they would solicit more advice and
information or monitoring data to make their decision,
or make a change to the type of evacuation (again in the
‘reduced’ category of Lipshitz & Strauss). There would need to be a lot more information from
survey points etc. prior to a full evacuation, however
judging from this information, I would be focusing on an
evacuation and securing the area by early Friday morn-
ing. [non-scientist, verbal].This theme incomplete information, information needed
occurred more in response to the verbal statement
(19 occurrences) than the numerical statement (14 occur-
rences) (Table 5). Considering both statements, scientistscommented more about this lack of information than
non-scientists, where the theme occurred 20 times in the
scientists' comments and 14 times in the non-scientists'.
These scientists stated a reluctance to make a decision
with this incomplete information, with their focus being
on the lack of information about impacts and the volcano
type and hazards. Evacuation or not depends entirely on likelihood, type,
severity of impacts on Awha. We’re not given this infor-
mation. For example if Awha is upwind of the volcano,
beyond ballistic impact zones and away from lava, lahar
or pyro[clastic] flow paths, then evacuation is unlikely
to be needed. Volcano status has to be continuously
monitored and EM's kept updated of change. [scientist,
numerical]The theme assumptions made (as part of the ‘reducing’
approach to managing uncertainty of Lipshitz and Strauss
[59]; Table 1) only occurred 4 times in the responses to
the numerical statement, and 2 times in the responses to
the numerical statement (Table 5), and those assumptions
raised were primarily about the impacts as well as evacua-
tion processes and the evolution of activity throughout the
week. However, it is likely that many other assumptions
were made, but not referred to. My assumption is that any scale for the eruption would
affect Awha and be a threat to its inhabitants. The other
assumption is that an evacuation plan is ready and the
authorities operational. [scientist, numerical]. I assume that if a 2-week window is given, activity level is
ramping up but not yet close to a critical level. But I
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accelerate rapidly, and 48 h could be too long if precursors
accelerate [scientist, verbal].
As would be expected based on our analysis so far, the
theme level of certainty or confidence occurred more in
the responses to the verbal probability statement than for
the numerical statement (Numerical: 10, Verbal: 4; Table 5): Without knowing what level of confidence ‘likely chance’
represents in this scenario it's not possible to recommend
an evacuation date. [scientist, verbal].
Lipshitz and Strauss [59] also highlighted that indivi-
duals ‘acknowledged’ uncertainty as an approach to deci-
sions under uncertainty, and from the themes analysed so
far, the use of evacuation thresholds can be seen as a way
of acknowledging uncertain information. A number of
participants specifically weighed up the pros and cons of
different approaches as a way of acknowledging uncer-
tainty, using a cost-benefit approach for managing uncer-
tainty, with 6 occurrences of this theme in the responses to
both the numerical and verbal conditions. For example: Necessary to determine the cost, in lives, of the evacuation
against the cost, in lives, of an eruption. Only then are you
able to determine which is the best option that minimizes
loss of life. Both scenarios have the potential to cause the
loss of life, and numerous variables must be considered.
[scientist, verbal]. In terms of managing risk, the likelihood (high) combined
with the consequence (unstated) results in the level of
risk. This, combined with proximity (within two weeks)
must be balanced with the veracity of the information
and the opportunity cost of evacuating. [non-scientist,
verbal].Very few comments mentioned tactics that might fall
within Lipshitz & Strauss's approach of ‘suppressing’ the
uncertainty through ignoring it, relying on intuition, or
rationalizing away doubts, an approach that reflects more
affective type of processing (see Section 1.1). However, our
analysis is based only on those people that chose to
comment and share their thoughts, and this strategy
may have been adopted but not reflected in the comments,
especially if, due to the intuitive nature of the decision,
participants did not feel the need to comment.
3.1.6. Public action, public perception and future issues
A number of respondents raised issues relating to
public action, in terms of preparing the public for an
evacuation, that a self or voluntary evacuation may occur,
or that the public would be non-compliant to an evacua-
tion order If it is likely to occur in the next 2 weeks, residents should
be evacuated now; as certainly as some portion of the
population will not comply to evacuation orders, once the
eruption begins, efforts would have to be focused on arapid evacuation of that smaller population who did not
evacuate [non-scientist, verbal].
These three themes occurred 15 times in response to
the numerical statement, and 12 times in response to the
verbal statement (see Table 5); and for both statements
the majority of these occurrences originated from non-
scientists reflecting their response concerns and roles,
with 19 occurrences for the non-scientists' responses and
8 for the scientists' responses (see Table 6). The issue of
compliance to warnings is closely related to public percep-
tion issues raised by a number of participants: The population can see and feel the volcanic activity. They
need assurance that authorities are also aware and are
responding and advice of what they should or should not
do. This includes preparing the public for the possibility of
evacuation. [non-scientist, verbal].
There is some discussion in the disaster and emergency
management community that a fear of non-compliance to
future warnings may prevent emergency managers from
issuing an evacuation order in response to an event that may
not occur. This fear of being labelled ‘cry-wolf’ and the
damage that it may have on future warning compliance
has anecdotally been said to affect key decision makers
[34,27,94,111,93], even though there is little empirical evi-
dence for this behaviour [61]. This behaviour could reflect a
move towards an affective style of processing rather than an
analytical style (see Section 1.1) by the decision makers,
whereby their (lack of) previous (analytical) experience (of
volcanic uncertainty), acts to heighten levels of anxiety and a
lack of perceived control (i.e., it activates the ‘dread’ aspect of
risk) to constrain their decision making from a logical reason
based approach towards one mediated by past experience
[24], with social and political concerns (e.g., the cost of an
evacuation) coming to dominate how they frame their
interpretation. This elevation of anxiety may also affect their
belief or trust that the community will respond, resulting
in a fear of being labelled ‘cry wolf’, further impacting
their decision making. This issue was indeed raised as a
decision consideration, and was specifically mentioned by 3
participants: You need to pay credence to expert advice. My opinion
better to err on the side of caution than to risk lives. There
is the risk factor then of ‘the boy who cried wolf’ if the
eruption does not occur. This has to be managed as best it
can. [non-scientist, numerical]. To play it perfectly safe, we should evacuate now. How-
ever, if we do and nothing happens, there is a high
probability that the next time the people will be less
likely to heed our warning. [non-scientist, numerical]. It really depends on the volcano – evacuations can be
done too early losing the trust of those living alongside the
volcano; or too late, resulting in mass casualties and
deaths. [non-scientist, verbal].
Related to this, participants commented on a number of
other future issues, including the view that any evacuation
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for responders, receivers, and the general public” [non-
scientist, numerical]. In addition, some participants con-
sidered that an earlier evacuation “may provide for a better
qualitative result for taking care of complex human needs
and long term recovery during all phases of an orderly and
safe evacuation” [non-scientist, verbal].3.1.7. Evacuation technicalities
The other dominant themes identified in the free
response comments were those that referred specifically
to evacuation technicalities, ranging from the actual eva-
cuation process, to the evacuation time scheduling, and a
consideration of complexities such as humanitarian needs,
pets, conditions (daylight), and what type of evacuation
should be issued (mandatory or voluntary), as well as
whether it should be staged or prioritized. This theme was
very prevalent in all responses, and occurred 29 times in
the responses to the numerical statement, and 25 times
in the responses to the verbal statement (Table 5).
As expected, the non-scientists raise these issues more
than the scientists, particularly with the verbal statement
where the theme occurred 19 times in the non-scientists'
responses and 7 times in the scientists' responses (see
Table 6). In the absence of any further forecasts I would begin a
prioritized limited evacuation (e.g., nearest areas, con-
gested/remote areas, mobility-impaired populations) and
make preparations for an accelerated “mass” evacuation
should indications warrant. [non-scientist, numerical]. There may be a staged evacuation of vulnerable commu-
nities immediately with other people encouraged to
self evacuate and a forced evacuation pending dependant
on further information being available. [scientist,
numerical].
3.2. People who chose not to evacuate
For the numerical statement, 9.6% of participants chose
not to evacuate (4.9% of scientists, 15.6% of non-scientists).
For the verbal statement, 28.2% chose not to evacuate
(30.3% of scientists, 26.3% of non-scientists). Considering
first the numerical statement, very few reasons or expla-
nations were given for why people chose not to evacuate.
For those that did choose to comment, reasons included
probability evacuation thresholds and that “there is not a
high enough likelihood to evacuate the population – there is
still a 17% likelihood that there won't be an eruption” [non-
scientist, numerical], and that there “is a high degree of
uncertainty – would not alarm me” [scientist, numerical].
Others chose to let's wait and see, citing fear of falsely
alarming the public (public perception) and that “if we do
[evacuate] and nothing happens, there is a high probability
that the next time the people will be less likely to heed our
warning” [non-scientist, numerical], or that there is not
enough accuracy to “shut down the city” [non-scientist,
numerical]. Others who chose not to evacuate explained
that they would get the evacuation planning and prepara-
tion underway now (evacuation technicalities), noting thatthey would have their “plans dusted off” [non-scientist,
numerical], and would “increase public awareness and pre-
position some resources to expedite the evacuation process if
needed” [non-scientist, numerical].
However, for the verbal statement, there were many
occurrences of themes that related to non-evacuation for
those that chose not to evacuate (see Tables 4–6), reflect-
ing the higher number of people who chose not to
evacuate. The majority of these comments referencing
non-evacuation fell in the incomplete information theme
(12 occurrences, see Tables 4 and 5), where respondents'
approach to managing uncertainty was to reduce it by
waiting for further information about the monitoring data
and the hazards, and updates in the probability forecasts More definitive explanations would be required. The city
should be on ‘high alert’ with residents advised that
a rapid evacuation may be necessary at any time. [non-
scientist, verbal].
Others stated issues around probability evacuation
thresholds and the level of confidence, stating that “a
decision for evacuation can be made when there is greater
certainty” [non-scientist, verbal]. The limitations of the
science advice and probability forecasts were also raised: Without knowing what level of confidence ‘likely chance’
represents in this scenario it's not possible to recommend
an evacuation date. e.g., if ‘likely chance’ is only the
second step on a ten step warning scale then the answer
is a safe no. If, however, ‘likely chance’ is the highest level
of threat on the scale then I would say yes and order the
evacuation to begin immediately, especially if there was
no further chance of evidence to indicate the eruption was
more or less imminent. [scientist, verbal].
A number of respondents suggested that evacuation
technicalities get under way in preparation for any future
response or that a limited prioritized eruption should be
started, with an increase in dialogue with the scientists: A determination of “likely” chance of eruption within the
next two weeks should result in increased emergency
operations – i.e. increased situational awareness, increased
monitoring, and more frequent updates/briefings; it should
trigger evacuation preparedness activities and contingency
operations, not necessarily the evacuation itself. The second
week, if conditions remain the same, I would begin
evacuation of special needs populations – i.e. those that
cannot evacuate themselves. [non-scientist, verbal].
As with the numerical statement, the issue of public
perception was raised. However, in terms of needing
enough information or having high enough levels of risk
to “justify an evacuation plan of this magnitude [scientist,
verbal], with some participants also choosing to ‘acknowl-
edge’ the uncertainty through a cost-benefit approach”.
In sum, these comments indicate that respondents who
chose (or reacted to uncertainty) not to evacuate did not
completely discount the risk, as the majority decided to
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until more advice was available, and to ready resources
and the public for such evacuation if needed. The majority
of these latter comments came from non-scientists, reflect-
ing the responsibilities that those individuals would have
during an eruption. As expected, more respondents in the
verbal group (likely) adopted this latter wait and see
approach, reflecting the lower perceived likelihood for
that statement compared to the numerical equivalent
(73–83%). For the numerical statement, the people who
chose not to evacuate cited the possibility of a non-event
and the damage to public perception of the authorities,
with some still readying resources.
Interestingly, whenwe compare all comments raised by
the scientists and non-scientists across both conditions, the
scientists tended to query the scientific advice and express
dissatisfaction about the quality and lack of information as
reasons for not evacuating, whereas the non-scientists
tended more towards expressing a desire to wait for more
information while however preparing for evacuation. This
can be seen in the prevalence of themes illustrated in
Table 6, where the themes ‘evacuation technicalities’ and
‘let's wait and see’ occur more often for non-scientists than
the scientists; and themes discussing the ‘science advice’
and the ‘quality of the information’ relating to ways of
‘managing uncertainty’ occur more often for the scientists
than the non-scientists.
More of the non-scientists chose an evacuation even
with the limited scientific information available than the
scientists, commenting on the process and technicalities
and the actions they would take, thereby acknowledging or
suppressing the uncertainty [59]. The scientists however
focused more on the information and the quality of the
information, choosing to reduce the uncertainty in the
source (information) before proceeding.
4. Experiment 2: a higher likelihood scenario
We now investigate whether the evacuation decision is
affected by the probability format when a higher like-
lihood scenario is considered. For this, the numerical
group were presented with “… a 45–55% probability of an
eruption occurring within the next 3 days”, and the verbal
group with “… a medium likelihood chance of an eruption
occurring within the next 3 days” (see Fig. 2). Results are
presented in Fig. 4, and we find that for the numerical
group, 72.9% of respondents choose an evacuation (n¼70,
48.6% on Monday morning, omitting non-responders
throughout), while for the verbal group, 71.8% choose an
evacuation (n¼71, 43.7% on Monday morning). We find no
significant relationship between the probability format
and the evacuation decision (see Table 7). Considering
only scientists, 69.7% evacuate in the numerical group
(n¼33) and 71.1% in the verbal group (n¼38); while for
the non-scientists, 75% evacuate in the numerical group
(n¼36) and 72.7% in the verbal group (n¼33). Again, no
significant difference is found between responses to the
numerical and verbal phrasing for each of these career
groups (see Table 7). These results demonstrate that the
different evacuation decisions observed between partici-
pants presented with verbal and numerical probabilitiesfor the 2 week scenario (experiment 1: Figs. 1 and 3), is not
observed for the shorter time frame scenario (experiment
2: Figs. 2 and 4). It appears that the shorter scenario is
reducing any effects due to the different probability
format.
It is interesting to also directly compare the decision
behaviour across the groups presented with the numerical
statements in experiments 1 and 2, as experiment 2 (45–
55%, 3 days) represents a higher likelihood, or more certain,
scenario than experiment 1 (73–83%, 2 weeks). To explain, if
we were to hypothetically consider the likelihood through-
out the time windows to be independent on each day, and
of equal likelihood distribution (i.e. neither decreasing or
increasing throughout the stated time), then the probability
on Monday for experiment 1's 2 week statement is 9 to 12%,
while the probability on Monday for experiment 2's 3 day
statement is 18–23%. Admittedly we cannot infer these
values directly, as the scenarios provide no information
about distribution throughout the week (it could increase,
decrease or plateau) or any conditional probability between
days. However, based on the information provided in each
statement, it is reasonable to assume that the second
shorter scenario corresponds to a higher likelihood on the
Monday.
Interestingly, however, when we directly compare the
decision behaviour between experiments for all partici-
pants, more participants choose an evacuation for experi-
ment 1 (90.4%) than experiment 2 (72.5%). This significant
difference (χ2(1, N¼143)¼7.402, p¼0.007, medium effect
size V¼0.228) is in the opposite direction to what the logic
described above would predict, whereby experiment 2
should have a higher number of evacuations. It seems that
participants fail to recognize the influence of the stated
time window on the overall likelihood. Rather than evac-
uate in greater numbers for the higher likelihood situation
(experiment 2, 45–55%, 3 days), more participants evacu-
ate for the situation with the higher probability numbers
(experiment 1, 73–83%, 2 weeks) failing to recognize that it
represents a lower likelihood on any given day within the
time window. It appears that even though some partici-
pants commented that the shorter time window “increased
the risk” (see qualitative analysis below), many partici-
pants base their decision on the value of probability
communicated (73–83% versus 45–55%) and do not
account for the different time windows (2 weeks versus
3 days).
For the statements that utilize the verbal probabilities,
logic would again indicate that experiment 2 (medium
likelihood, 3 days) represents a higher likelihood, or more
certain scenario, than experiment 1 (likely, 2 weeks).
However, the same proportions of respondents chose an
evacuation for both scenarios (71.8% in each case). These
data show the same issues as for the numerical statement,
but to a lesser degree due to the uncertainty and variance
in perception inherent in these verbal terms.
4.1. Reasons given for evacuation decision
The reasons given for evacuation are not dissimilar to
those provided in response to experiment 1's long time
window scenario (see Section 3.1), and so we only briefly
Fig. 4. The evacuation decision or not, and the time chosen to evacuate, for experiment 2 (Fig. 2) and numerical probability experiment group (45–55%)
and the verbal probability experiment group (medium likelihood). Results are shown for participants who identified as scientists (dark grey) and non-
scientists (light grey).
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ences in the distribution and prevalence of the theme
occurrences in the free text responses to the two scenarios
(Tables 5, 6 and 8), as follows.
Considering first the group that received the verbal
statement (medium likelihood) a greater proportion of thecomments mentioned a cost-benefit approach to managing
uncertainty for this short time window statement (7 theme
occurrences) compared to the previous long time window
scenario (3 theme occurrences); evacuation thresholds
were also discussed more often (Exp 1: 7 occurrences,
Exp 2: 11 occurrences), as well as issues relating to public
Table 7
The total number (N) of participants in each experiment and group and the percentage that chose to evacuate (% Yes), where non-responses were omitted
from the analysis. Results are shown for each experiment group (presented with either the numerical or verbal probabilities), and for all participants, as
well as for just those that identified as scientists and non-scientists. The percentage that chose to evacuate on Monday (experiment 1), and on Monday AM
(experiment 2), is also shown (% Mon). In addition, χ2 test results comparing the number who chose to evacuate for the numerical vs. verbal group are also
shown, and for those found to be significant the effect size (V) is given.
Numerical % Mon Verbal % Mon χ2 Test results and effect size
N % Yes N % Yes
Experiment 1: ‘73–83%’ or ‘likely’ … within the next 2 weeks
All 73 90.4 46.6 71 71.8 45.1 χ2(1, N¼144)¼7.914, p¼0.005, medium effect size V¼0.234
Scientists 41 95.1 53.7 33 69.7 42.4 χ2(1, N¼74)¼8.699, p¼0.003, moderate effect size V¼0.343
Non-scientists 32 84.4 37.5 38 73.7 47.4 χ2(1, N¼70)¼1.179, p¼0.278
Experiment 2: ‘45–55%’ or ‘medium likelihood’ … within the next 3 days
All 70a 72.9 48.6 71 71.8 43.7 χ2(1, N¼141)¼0.19, p¼0.892
Scientists 33 69.7 51.5 38 71.1 50 χ2(1, N¼71)¼0.016, p¼0.901
Non-scientists 36 75 47.2 33 72.7 36.4 χ2(1, N¼69)¼0.046, p¼0.830
a One participant in this group chose not to declare their career sector.
Table 8
The total number (Nt) of occurrences of all identified themes from the free text responses for each experiment group (e.g. scientists in the numerical
condition) in experiment 2, using the themes as described in Table 4. The number (N) and percentage (%) of occurrences of each particular theme, relative
to Nt, is also shown for each experiment group. Note that not all participants indicated whether they were non-scientists or scientists, and so for some
themes there is a difference in the total number for an experimental group as illustrated in Table 5.
Experiment 2 Numerical Verbal
Nt (number of occurrences of all themes in each experiment group): Science Non-science Science Non-science
49 56 66 52
Number (N) and % of each theme occurrence relative to all theme occurrences
Evacuation thresholds 3 6% 7 13% 4 6% 7 13%
Evacuation technicalities 4 8% 11 20% 14 21% 9 17%
No time to lose 9 18% 7 13% 11 17% 10 19%
Let's wait and see 1 2% 7 13% 8 12% 4 8%
Managing uncertainty (MU) 10 20% 9 16% 10 15% 5 10%
MU – cost benefit 1 2% 3 5% 6 9% 1 2%
MU – assumptions made 1 2% 1 2% 1 2% 0 0%
MU – incomplete information, information needed 8 16% 4 7% 3 5% 3 6%
MU – level of certainty or confidence 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2%
Time forecasts 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2%
Probability translations 1 2% 1 2% 3 5% 0 0%
Science advice, understanding, role 4 8% 3 5% 2 3% 1 2%
Public action 2 4% 1 2% 3 5% 5 10%
Public perception 1 2% 1 2% 1 2% 3 6%
Future issues – negatives, positives 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 2 4%
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comparison of the prevalence of themes for each experi-
ment, as indicated in Tables 6 and 8, illustrates that more
of the non-scientists commented on both these issues (see
Table 9 for notable comments). However, fewer of all
participants discussed methods for managing uncertainty
in terms of assumptions made and issues relating to
incomplete information compared to the previous longer
time window verbal scenario. There was also less discus-
sion of the science advice and any limitations around that
advice, or the understanding and translations of the
probability forecasts or time windows. Comments relating
to no time to lose and evacuating ASAP or initiating
evacuation processes or adopting the precautionary prin-
ciple were discussed about as often in response to thisverbal scenario as the long time window verbal scenario in
experiment 1 (see Tables 6 and 8).
The only major difference observed for the numerical
statement compared to the longer time window used in
experiment 1, was that there were fewer comments about
there being no time to lose, and few comments about it
being better to evacuate earlier, to adopt the precautionary
principle, or to prepare resources for evacuation (see the
prevalence of themes indicated in Tables 6 vs. 8, with
notable comments in Table 10). This is surprising, as
strictly speaking, this scenario has a higher likelihood than
the scenario in experiment 1. However, it is consistent
with our quantitative analysis, where fewer participants
evacuate for experiment 2 (72.5% evacuations for “45–55%,
3 days” versus 90.4% evacuations for “73–83%, 2 weeks”).
Table 9
Notable comments raised in response to the verbal statement of experiment 2 (medium likelihood, 3 days).
Experiment 2, Verbal probability statement: non-scientists
 Need something more than a medium likelihood. Concern with evacuating the population and the “medium likelihood” persists for weeks or months,
how do you allow people to return when the risk remains the same as when they were initially evacuated.
 Again, marshal the resources and be ready to issue the order, but I would not tell the population to leave based on a medium likelihood. I seriously
doubt that even if an evacuation order was issued that many people would leave, based on that probability.
 Even a 50% chance of an eruption is too high not to evacuate immediately.
 Need more specifics than “medium likelihood”. If you were to evacuate based on that information the “medium likelihood” may persist for several
weeks or months and if that were to happen you would have a large percentage of the population returning to their homes due to evacuation fatigue,
and it would be much more difficult to get them to evacuate a second time.
 3 Days isn't very long. better to err on the side of caution, better to be criticized for something you did rather than something you didn't do...
 I would begin phased evacuation preparedness activities and operations – specifically – evacuation of non-ambulatory medical special needs
populations, requesting hospitals transfer patients out of the area, cancel elective surgeries, prepare to increase urge capacity, cancel essential
personnel vacations, etc.
 There is not enough information to justify an evacuation.
 I would understand the statement to say execute the plan to marshal the resources. At some point within the next 48 h the decision to move with or
without the resources in place maybe necessary. I would recommend executing the plan. At a minimum, the most time intensive elements.
 Planning and resourcing needs to be done asap so that the evacuation can be done as soon as possible when the eruption is imminent
Experiment 2, Verbal probability statement: scientists
 Again the balance between loss of life and Livelihood(evacuation and eruption) is important.
 Begin evacuation immediately. The financial loss of an evacuation for only a few days is not worth the risk of full destruction of your capital city. PR-
wise, overabundance of caution is also less damaging than failure to protect your people (including our government people) from catastrophe. If you
evacuate your government but not your citizens, there would be huge loss of faith and trust in the government.
 Not clear likelihood of eruption high enough to warrant evacuation – and I'm glad it's only hypothetical
 Any evacuation may be done in terms of identifying those most vulnerable and providing information to the rest of the community to enable them to
make their own decision as to whether to self evacuate.
 If the primary goal is to save lives then why wait? Beginning the evacuation process could be as simple as mobilizing transport, coordinating relief
centres and identifying those with special needs (e.g. transportation, livestock, grain storage, etc.). his should begin immediately.
 This is answer involves taking a precautionary principle approach on the assumptions that ‘medium likelihood’ is a higher than even chance
probability and that this warning represents a new increase in the level of warning. If the scenario said this was the 10th day in a row the scientists
had given this same bulletin then I might answer differently. In this scenario the trend is as or more important than the probability alone.
 Same reasoning as previous answer, more urgent given the time frame is shorter, even though the probability is lower (my perception of lower at
least).
 In simple terms I believe a medium likelihood to be a 50/50 probability of an eruption and therefore preparations for an evacuation to be a prudent
measure
 What does medium likelihood mean, that is the key, isn't it? I would interpret it to be 450% which means it is prudent to begin evacuation.
 I feel the mobilization process should begin now and let the volcanic activity develop to the point of needing evacuation. The proper authorities will
be ready and the evacuation should run more quickly.
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evacuate less, comment less about evacuating straight
away or ASAP, and generally not feeling the need to
comment on why they chose an evacuation or to justify
their decision.
Considering only experiment 2, for the verbal state-
ment there were slightly more comments relating to
incomplete information and ways of managing uncertainty
compared to the equivalent numerical statement (see
prevalence of themes indicated in Tables 6 and 8), with
participants stating that they would reduce this uncer-
tainty by waiting for more advice as well as acknowl-
edging the uncertainty through a cost-benefit approach.
For these participants, this may reflect their view that the
verbal statement represents a lower likelihood and greater
uncertainty. This reflects the greater ambiguity in verbal
statements and the greater complexities in deciding on
evacuations when that phrasing is used.
4.2. People who chose not to evacuate
For the verbal statement, the people who chose to not
evacuate commented mostly on evacuation thresholds,
noting that the likelihood was not high enough forevacuation, cost-benefit issues between the cost of evacua-
tion and the damage to the public perception and any
future compliance due to evacuation fatigue. Some also
noted that evacuation preparations should be made con-
sidering evacuation technicalities such as encouraging
voluntary evacuation rather than issuing any mandatory
evacuation order. For the numerical statement, people
who chose not to evacuate commented mostly on evacua-
tion thresholds and noted that the stated probability is “too
low to make a decision evacuate”, and discussed issues
relating to the lack of information and the related uncer-
tainty preventing them from making a decision.
5. Discussion
Many factors affect the understanding of probability
forecasts and influence decision making [21,20]. These
include framing, past experience, time and risk pressures,
base rate, background knowledge, outcome severity, the
level of uncertainty, competing time frames, and political
and economic factors (see Fig. 5). The results here show
that evacuation decisions are further influenced by (1)
perceived higher levels of certainty for numerical prob-
abilities over verbal likelihoods, particularly for scientists;
Table 10
Notable comments raised in response to the numerical statement of experiment 2 (45–55%, 3 days).
Experiment 2, Numerical probability statement: non-scientists
 This is dependent upon local risk tolerance and the quality of predictions provided by the volcanologists – assuming high reliability for the prediction
and low risk tolerance the better option is to at least begin evacuation of vulnerable populations early.
 You can't risk people's lives – order the evacuation straight away – give yourselves plenty of time to get out
 A 50:50 chance of significant death cannot be dismissed comfortably.
 It seems like it's worth waiting for better information.
 Tricky one – depends on whether a higher probability warning can be given with a 48 h window. But hard to justify an evacuation on a 50%
probability.
 There is a less than 55% chance of an eruption. At this point I would encourage people to have an evacuation plan, and if they have somewhere else
they can go, it would be advisable. But Not a full evacuation.
 The evacuation process should start when the volcanologists raise the probability somewhat. 45–55% isn't enough to make me want to displace the
residents and the seat of government. Another 15–20% probability, and I'd recommend initiating an evacuation.
 Evacuation is almost never an all-or-nothing proposition. I would begin an immediate prioritized evacuation of most vulnerable (including nearby
and isolated) and mobility-impaired populations while preparing for accelerated evacuation of the remaining population should conditions
deteriorate.
 Requires an instant decision and public safety would take precedence over the disruption
 Need something more than a medium likelihood. Concern with evacuating the population and the “medium likelihood” persists for weeks or months,
how do you allow people to return when the risk remains the same as when they were initially evacuated.
Experiment 2, Numerical probability statement: scientists
 Extent of risk combined with likelihood make the situation too hazardous to ignore.
 Presumably, you have some information about the intensity of the eruptions from Pomona – if the eruptions are always extremely violent, then you
begin the evacuation on an up trending intensity of precursory evidence. If the eruptions are of modest intensity, then prepare for an evacuation but
await progress toward a higher probability.
 Again, what is the expected impact of the eruption? If “there is a 45–55% probability of a large number of casualties within the next 3 days, if no
evacuation is undertaken”, then my answer is “Yes”. The evacuation should start Monday AM.
 If it's ignimbrite eruption yes evacuation on Monday morning; if it's fire fountain, no evacuation. I don't think a 50% chance is a good probability to be
given by scientist.. Throwing a coin is better!
 1/2 within 3 days is high. I think we need a probability trend within the next 7 and 15 days to take a more reasonable decision.
 I believe the probability is too low to warrant an evacuation just yet, since evacuating and then not having an eruption would lower the credibility of
the volcanologists in the future, when the probability of an eruption could be much higher.
 May still raise awareness and preparedness so that time for evacuation is reduced from 48 h to less.
 50–50 chance of it happening, and any prep done for evacuation is probably better than none. chance is that you'll save lives.
 The 3-day time window suggests rapidly accelerating unrest, so no time to lose, even with a 50/50 probability
 I'm not enough of statistician to know how to phrase the problem that's bothering me, but in essence I feel that “X% in T time” does not contain
enough information about how X will be reassessed as time passes for me to know how to interpret it
 Review probability daily and if an increase then move to evacuate. Suggest people voluntarily evacuate.
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probability value and the time window stated within a
forecast; and (3) career sector, and thus background
training and world view, with non-scientists focusing more
on potential actions that should be taken and scientists
focusing more on the quality and volume of the informa-
tion available in their reasons for evacuation or not. Each
of these is discussed in turn in the following sections.
5.1. Higher levels of certainty for numerical probabilities
Evacuations occur less frequently when a verbal like-
lihood is communicated instead of the numerical equiva-
lent. To chose these equivalent translation terms we used
the IPCC translation table (Section 1.2 and Table 2), in line
with our previous studies [21,20]. The decision results
examined in experiment 1 suggest that participants do not
see the terms “73–83%” and “likely” to be equivalent at all,
with scientists in particular making different decisions in
response to these different terms. This is consistent with
the results of Doyle et al. [21], who found that for this
study group ‘likely’ is translated to 68714% and “very
likely” is 83710%, values which overlap with the IPCC
translation table boundaries. If we modify the translationused herein to the alternative range suggested by Doyle
et al. [21], we find that the equivalent of the verbal
statement ‘likely’ is 68714%, which is very slightly lower
than the equivalent IPCC numerical value used herein (73–
83%), and this difference may explain some of the differ-
ences in evacuation rates. However, it is unlikely that this
translation difference is the sole reason that participants
issue evacuations less frequently for the verbal likelihood,
and the free text responses suggest that the main reason
for these lower rates of evacuation are that the verbal
terms (likely, medium likelihood) are viewed as more vague,
are more ambiguous and represent a less certain situation
than their numerical equivalents (73–83%, 45–55%).
When presented with the verbal term, more participants
acknowledged the possibility of a non-event, or chose to
wait for the situation to evolve before evacuating by
adopting the “wait and see” approach. They also discussed
more of the complexities and problems that may be
considered with any evacuation. In contrast, the group
that received the numerical probability commented much
more about the urgency of the situation, concentrating on
evacuation processes and technicalities. This is in line with
the finding of Budescu et al. [9] that the verbal probabil-
ities communicated in the 2007 IPCC report may have
Fig. 5. The factors that affect the interpretations of probabilistic forecasts and the influences on resultant decision making, after the graphical abstract of
Doyle et al. [20].
E.E.H. Doyle et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 10 (2014) 75–101 95implied higher levels of imprecision than were actually
present. The majority of these differences are due to the
judgments of scientists, suggesting they are more sensitive
to the format of the probability statements. These scien-
tists are more likely than the non-scientists to choose an
evacuation for the numerical statement rather than the
verbal. This difference in behaviour between these two
groups may be due to the scientists having a greater
familiarity with numerical probability statements, eliciting
a greater degree of confidence in numerical formats over
verbal formats.
We also find that a number of participants chose to
translate the verbal statement into a numerical percentage
probability, or a natural frequency, before making a deci-
sion. This increases the cognitive load as well as the
potential for translation mistakes, biases and miscommu-
nication. It is clear that the choice to use either verbal or
numerical terms in a forecast does not just affect transla-
tions and likelihood perceptions, but has clear and poten-
tially larger impacts on evacuation behaviour and
reasoning. This behaviour is not observed for the short
time window examined in experiment 2, and as with the
framing and job sector effects discussed in Doyle et al. [20],
this is likely to be due to the shorter time windowmasking
these differences.
When we consider the recommendation to utilize
translation tables to standardize equivalent numerical
and verbal probability terms [33,9,64,20], we must also
be aware that failure of a scheme may not just be due to
the different hazard under consideration (volcanology vs.
climate change), the context, framing, or sample popula-
tion, but also be due to sample fluctuations between study
groups. Similar investigations to Doyle et al. [21] show a
range of variations in translation values. For example,
Budescu and Wallestein [113] identified that ‘likely’ is
translated to 74% (st. dev: 15%), Reagan et al. [88] to the
range of 65–85%, and Budescu et al. [9] that the central90% of translations of ‘likely’ is in the range 58–75%. These
differences in potential translations further highlight the
need to adopt a standardised translation scheme, and to
report numerical and verbal terms together [9]. Interest-
ingly, the World Meteorological Office has developed a
table for their use in weather forecasts based upon that of
the IPCC [33], but with additional categories either side of
the term medium likelihood. This is consistent with the
findings of Doyle et al. [21] which illustrates a wide gap in
translation values between the terms medium likelihood
and unlikely or likely, and the potential need for an
additional translation term between those categories.
The scheme that is adopted must still reflect, as close as
possible, the intuitive translation values that people have for
these terms and thus ideally should be developed from the
target community's perspective (non-volcanologists), such
that it more closely matches their intuitive use [20], helping
to facilitate effective communication in high pressure, short
time situations. It is also important to consider how these
tables could be developed for different languages, and this
should be investigated further in the context of work such
as Karelitz and Budescu [48], who have explored the
different translations of verbal probability phrases for six
native languages, including English, Turkish, Spanish, Ger-
man, Russian, and French; and who highlight that “com-
munication of uncertainty between languages introduces
another source of error that enhances miscommunication”
(p. 35).
5.2. The relationship between probabilities and time
windows
Our results indicate that many participants have a poor
understanding of the relationship between the probability
value and time window stated in a forecast. Doyle et al.
[21,20] found that participants skew their perceptions of
event likelihoods towards the end of stated time windows.
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identified that individuals may incorrectly interpret a
forecast due to ambiguity regarding the event being
predicted and a failure to understand the reference class
(in this case the time window). From a comparison of
evacuation choices in experiment 1 and 2, we find here
that many participants are also not correctly utilizing all
the information provided (probability value and time
duration). Instead they appear to be basing their decision
on the probability value alone. The inability to correctly
combine available information within a forecast or prob-
ability statement is similar to findings by Doyle [18] who
identified that individuals incorrectly judge long-term
probabilities due to annual probabilities, and that indivi-
duals' assessment of compound probabilities are substan-
tially in error compared to normative statistical rules, due
to the effect of intuitive heuristics and biases; and to
Wagenaar et al. [109] who demonstrated that misunder-
standings can occur due to the translation from the surface
structure of our decision problem (the story) to the deeper
structure of the decision problem itself.
We found in Section 4 that, considering all participants,
significantly fewer participants chose an evacuation for the
higher likelihood scenario described in the numerical
statement of experiment 2 (45–55%, 3 days) than for the
lower likelihood scenario described in experiment 1 (73–
83%, 2 weeks). This is thought to be due to them focusing
on the lower probability number (45–55%) in experiment
2's statement, and a failure to recognize the influence of
the shorter time window, which actually results in a much
higher likelihood scenario.
The incorrect perception that experiment 2 represents
a lower likelihood event is also reflected in the comments
provided, where participants raise more issues relating to
the management of uncertainty and there are fewer
comments pertaining to the urgency of the situation or
evacuation processes and technicalities. An incorrect
understanding of the relationships between probabilities
and time durations in a forecast could result in delays in
evacuation decisions, which could be costly in terms of life
safety, expense, and reputation. When we consider the
career sector for these participants, we find that there is a
significant difference between the number of scientists
that chose to evacuate for the lower likelihood scenario
(experiment 1, where 95.1% evacuate) than for the higher
likelihood scenario (experiment 2, where 69.7% evacuate),
considering the numerical statements in each case (χ2(1,
N¼74)¼8.699, p¼0.003, moderate effect size V¼0.343).
However, while more non-scientists also evacuate for
experiment 1 (84.4%) compared to experiment 2 (75%),
the difference in their behaviour is not statistically sig-
nificant; and so it appears that the significant difference in
evacuation behaviour seen for all participants between the
two experiments is mainly due to the interpretations and
behaviour of the scientists, who are focusing more on the
value of the probability number than the time window.
The non-scientists thus appear to more accurately
account for the influence of the time frame, and do not
have a significant majority evacuating for what is actually
the lower likelihood scenario (experiment 1). This may be
because the experience and background of the participantsconsidered here concentrates their thinking on the actions
required, and thus the timing, scheduling and logistics
required for that decision (discussed further in the follow-
ing section), and thus they consider the stated time frame
to be of equal priority in their decision process as the
stated probability value. This is further supported by the
fact that a number of non-scientists seemed to work
backwards from the end of the time window to calculate
the time an evacuation should occur, accounting for the
time it would take to instigate any evacuation order. Their
focus on time scheduling and sequencing in their decision
does however have the potential to introduce more
uncertainty into the decision process, as they assess how
long they think these processes will occur and related
consequences or impacts.
We suggest that how individuals combine numerical
probability values and time frames stated within forecasts,
and how that influences their perception of the likelihood
of that forecast, should be investigated further. For exam-
ple, would there still be the apparent greater focus on the
probability number over the time window, if the order of
time and probability were swapped in the forecast (such
that it said “within the next 2 weeks, the probability is
75–83%” instead of “the probability is 73–83% within the
next 2 weeks”)?
5.3. Career sector, decision reasoning, uncertainty and trust
Interestingly, as also discussed in Section 4.1, compar-
ison of the percentage prevalence of themes identified
from comments given by scientists and non-scientists
across experiments 1 and 2 (and illustrated in Tables 6
and 8), indicate that the scientists tended to query the
scientific advice and express dissatisfaction about the
quality and lack of information as reasons for not evacuat-
ing (which reflects their core business of data collection),
whereas the non-scientists tended more to express a
desire to wait for more information (which reflects their
role as recipients of information and as passive planners
about what could happen) while still stating their inten-
tion to start the process of preparing for evacuation. Many
more of the non-scientists chose an evacuation even with
the limited information compared to the scientists, com-
menting on the process and technicalities and the actions
they would take, thereby either acknowledging or suppres-
sing the uncertainty in order to make their decisions [59].
The scientists however focused more on the information
and the quality of that information, choosing to reduce the
uncertainty in the source (information) before proceeding.
The different comments raised by scientists and non-
scientists, as well as the significantly different evacuation
behaviour and perceptions observed between these two
groups, highlights the complexities that can arise when
these two communities respond together to an event.
Ideally, for an effective response to an event, all respond-
ing individuals and organizations should have a shared
mental model about response and communication
[69,5,37], and a mutual understanding of the needs,
responsibilities, demands and roles of each party and their
capacity to anticipate other parties' demands and decision
needs [92,58,79,19]. The quality of these shared mental
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tive team-based simulations [15,10,81,85,4], as well as
from the analysis of past responses. While this process
works well with objective information, the probabilistic
data communicated from scientists to emergency decision
makers is more open to interpretation [80]. In addition, it
is unclear how uncertainty in the science and in the
situation affects these mental models and communication
pathways and the relationship between these two com-
munities, as well as issues around trust, credibility and
confidence in communications.
Throughout a volcanic crisis, it is vital that communities
and stakeholders continue to trust the science providers and
their message [35]. This trust can be challenged when high
levels of uncertainty exist and recipients in situations of high
pressure, low time, and limited resources, are totally reliant
on scientific sources with whom they may rarely interact
under normal circumstances. As stated by Siegrist et al. [95,
p. 146], “One way people cope with […] lack of knowledge is
to rely on social trust to reduce the complexity they are
faced with”. For the science providers, it is reassuring then
to know that some researchers have shown that the com-
munication of uncertainty can enhance the credibility and
trustworthiness of the information provider (see reviews in
[43,42,99,68,110]), making the provider seem more ‘honest’
[41], which should strengthen the relationships between
key decision makers and scientists. Peterson and Tilling [84,
p. 348] stated in their review of responses to volcanic
eruptions that “people may have unrealistic expectations
of scientists' forecasting ability, and if actual events do not
coincide with cautiously expressed expectations of scien-
tists, or if scientists decline to provide specific forecasts,
people may question the ability, credibility, and motives of
the scientists”. Perhaps if the communications had included
the range of uncertainties inherent in the forecasts, this
could have been mitigated, and actually enhanced the
relationships, understanding and trust.
However, Kuhn [54] cautions that if we do commu-
nicate a range of uncertainty estimates, decision makers
may focus more on either side of a range of uncertainty
estimates around an “anchor probability”, resulting in the
risk posed being attenuated or amplified (p. 43). This
selective interpretation of uncertainty can be due to an
alignment of pre-existing attitudes and beliefs (Lord et al.
as cited in [54, p. 43]), and can be used as a reason to
discount the seriousness of any threat or justify a parti-
cular political agenda. In addition, other studies have
suggested that communicating uncertainty can decrease
people's trust in, and credibility of, the provider
[43,42,99,68,110], and that it can allow people to justify
inaction or their own agenda, or to perceive the risk as
being higher or lower than it is, depending on their
attitudes.
What is clear is that the role of trust and mutual
understanding between these two communities is parti-
cularly important for communications in the emergency
management context where officials make decisions based
upon scientific experts and advisors in situations charac-
terized by high pressure, low time and limited resources.
As stated by Miles and Frewer [68, p. 281], “if scientific
uncertainty is to be increasingly communicated to thepublic, the effects on trust in both risk regulators and
communicators must be empirically examined”. This is
particularly important for future response capability and
long term responses, as any loss of trust can persist well
into the future and affect the quality of relationships over
long periods of time and for future events. This issue
identifies a need to consider the long term implications of
direct scientist-non-scientist relationships in the context
of infrequent events.
6. Conclusions
The issuing of forecasts and warnings of natural hazard
events, such as volcanic eruptions, earthquake aftershock
sequences and extreme weather often involves the use of
probabilistic terms, particularly when communicated by
scientific advisory groups to key decision makers who
differ in expertise and their function in the decision
making process. We find here that it is not just whether
uncertainty is communicated or not that can affect the
decision making, but also the way we understand the
actual terms we use to communicate uncertainties within
our advice. If one adopts probabilities as a method to
encompass some of these uncertainties, providers must be
aware that there are differences in the perception of what
they mean, how people make choices based on them, and
the understanding of competing time frames as illustrated
in Fig. 5. The severity of an outcome can influence the
perception of a probability [8,82], and it is not unreason-
able to assume that this ‘severity’ can range from physical
through to political or economic impacts. Thus different
audiences of scientific information may be influenced by
the ‘political severity’ of decisions to differing degrees due
to the relative importance of political or economic influ-
ence that they may place on the interpretation. This
further affects their interpretations and perceptions of
probabilities and event likelihoods. It is thus important
to understand how scientists and other authorities impose
meaning on, interpret and understand the distribution of
the outcome likelihood within these time frames. This
meaning is developed within different professional frames
of reference and groups with different goals, and any
meaning derived from the scientists' mental model may
be inconsistent with a practitioner's mental model and
goals (e.g., what may happen vs. do we need to evacuate or
not; [80])
Our results show that people have a poor understand-
ing of time windows stated with forecasts in particular,
skewing their perceptions to the end of a time window
and incorrectly understanding the relationship between
time stated and probability, resulting in an under or over-
estimate of forecast likelihoods. In addition, they under-
estimate the scenario likelihood when verbal terms are
used. These differences in perception significantly affect
decisions, and if emergency managers receiving the scien-
tific advice are affected by different perceptions of the
wording of the probability itself, they may enact different
actions based upon the same probabilistic advice which
has been formatted in different ways (verbal vs. numerical,
using the terms ‘in’ or ‘within’, focusing on short or long
time windows, [20]; and see also [46]).
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ment of a response is dependent upon not just the com-
munication between scientists and emergency managers,
but also the onward communication of this information to
the communities through public education programs and
warnings [102,51,28,12,13,2,55,101,67]. Thus, irrespective of
the objective quality of the information from the scientific
community, its ability to have the desired effect is influ-
enced by how it is interpreted and filtered as it is trans-
mitted through these various recipients. It is thus vital that
any communication between scientific agencies and emer-
gency managers maintains its true meaning in that com-
munication prior to the next step, such that it is accurately
communicated onward to the public through bulletins,
warnings and advice. It is thus important to identify
communication strategies that may help to mitigate these
different perceptions and to help prevent onward miscom-
munications, or premature, delayed, or unnecessary action
choices.
Based on our findings here and those of Doyle et al.
[21,20], we suggest that when scientists have calculated or
estimated likelihood forecasts involving time windows
(which is itself a challenging task due to the fluctuating
levels of unrest; [100,56,90,105]), that they make all possi-
ble efforts to communicate such forecasts, likelihoods, and
probabilities over a range of relevant time windows, includ-
ing a probability forecast for a shorter immediate time
window in particular (such as the first 24 h). This will help
to anchor this probabilistic information in the present, and
prevent any underestimate of the probability of an event
‘today’, while also reducing the misunderstanding of the
interaction between the stated probability and time win-
dow in a forecast. This is vital, as these short time frames
are often when major decisions such as evacuations are
made, and any interpretive bias due to a skew in time
perception may lead key decision makers to overestimate
any time available to enact their action choice.
Our results herein have considered a simple forecast
evacuation decision scenario (“at least 48 h to evacuate”).
However, as discussed by Marrero et al. [63], there can be a
considerable time-lapse between the evacuation decision-
making time and time in which an evacuation is complete,
depending upon the socio-economic status of the resident
population, the transportation network, evacuation plan,
number of evacuees, compliance with evacuation orders,
environmental schemes as well as many other complicat-
ing factors. Thus, these complexities in evacuation and the
need for flexible evacuation planning further highlights
the need to ensure that any potential interpretive bias due
a skew in forecast time perception is mitigated for with
the use of multiple time windows. As discussed earlier, it is
important that scientific advice is timely, accurate and
meets the needs of the diverse decision makers, emer-
gency managers and public involved in a crisis. Thus,
through pre-crisis exercises, scenarios and discussions,
the ideal forecast time windows should be identified
through an assessment of stakeholder decision making
and action planning thresholds. As discussed by Morss
et al. (in the context of meteorological forecasts; [70]), the
effectiveness of information communication should be
evaluated from different perspectives, it is more importantthat end-users understand the forecast well enough to
inform their decisions, and less important that they under-
stand the precise scientific details.
Budescu et al. [9], also suggest that a forecast or
probability statement should state both the numerical
and verbal equivalents of the probability, such that the
message includes the more ‘accessible’ verbal term as well
as a numerical term that is less subject to bias, and that a
standardised translation scheme should be used to move
from one to the other. From our results herein we further
advocate this approach, as verbal probability terms alone
seem to be viewed as representing a less certain, less
confident, or lower likelihood scenario than their numer-
ical equivalents; resulting in less decisive action. However,
when incorporating these recommendations, and those
outlined in Doyle et al. [20], care must be taken to ensure
the message does not become too complex, as providing as
much advice as possible may hinder the decision process,
due to cognitive overload [87,74]. Finally, we highlight that
these translation tables should not be mistaken for
decision-making or warning tools, but rather translation
guides to facilitate the move between verbal phrases
and their equivalent numerical terms. Any formalised
communication strategy should be accompanied by exer-
cises, simulations, and education programs with both the
decision-makers and the public to help facilitate a greater
understanding of the complexities inherent in these
uncertain forecasts.Acknowledgements
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